Regulation, interests, and dual disclosure
informational distortions in brazilian electric companies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.16930/2237-766220263686Keywords:
regulation theory, dual disclosure, informational distortions, electricity sectorAbstract
This theoretical essay aims to analyze how dual accounting regulation in the Brazilian electricity sector, structured around corporate (IFRS) and regulatory (MCSE/Aneel) standards, produces informational distortions and may foster regulatory capture practices within an institutional environment marked by asymmetries and conflicting incentives. The originality of this study lies in the integration of three theoretical perspectives, Public Interest Theory, Economic Theory of Regulation, and Capture Theory, articulated with the contemporary literature on accounting information quality, informational asymmetry, and enforcement, thereby providing an analytical framework that remains underexplored in Brazilian regulatory accounting research. The relevance of this study stems from the strategic role of the electricity sector as essential infrastructure and from the growing dependence on accounting information for tariff-setting decisions, service provision oversight, and institutional monitoring, within a context in which regulatory divergences intensify tensions among the State, firms, and users. Methodologically, the study adopts a reflective and argumentative approach, supported by a critical analysis of both classical and contemporary literature, organized around three axes: foundations of regulation, informational effects of dual disclosure, and the role of enforcement. The findings indicate that the coexistence of standards with distinct purposes intensifies informational asymmetries, reduces comparability, encourages accounting arbitrage practices, and weakens regulatory governance, particularly in environments characterized by limited supervisory capacity. The study contributes by demonstrating that accounting, far from being neutral, operates as a strategic mechanism for generating informational power, reinforcing the need for greater integration among standards, incentives, and enforcement mechanisms to ensure transparency and safeguard the public interest.
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