Gerenciamento de resultados
análise do poder do CEO na presença de conexões sociais
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.16930/2237-766220213230Palavras-chave:
Gerenciamento de Resultados, Powerful CEOs, Conexões Sociais, GovernançaResumo
Este estudo teve como objetivo analisar a influência de CEOs poderosos no gerenciamento de resultados (GR) considerando a presença de conexões sociais entre o CEO e os membros do Conselho de Administração (CA). A amostra foi constituída de 183 empresas brasileiras listadas na [B]3 S.A. no período de 2011 a 2017, totalizando 881 observações. O GR foi mensurado pelo modelo de Jones (1991) e Jones Modificado (1995) e considerada a variável dependente, sob qual foi analisado o efeito de: (i) uma métrica de poder do CEO desenvolvida por análise de componentes principais a partir de uma ótica multidimensional de poder (poder estrutural, poder de propriedade, poder de especialização e poder de prestígio), (ii) um índice que mensura o nível das conexões sociais entre o CEO e os membros do CA a partir de indicadores já revisados pela literatura (background educacional, profissional e relações familiares), e (iii) a interação entre estas variáveis. Os resultados das 6 estimações de regressões lineares (MQO) com pools de cross-section e erros-robustos indicam que CEOs poderosos estão relacionados a maiores níveis de accruals discricionários, enquanto as conexões sociais mitigam o GR. Quando incluída a interação entre essas variáveis, tanto o poder do CEO quanto as conexões sociais perdem o efeito significativo sobre o GR, indicando que na presença das conexões sociais, CEOs poderosos podem deixar de se engajar em práticas de GR. Esse resultado contribui para a discussão sobre a interferência de fatores sociais sobre decisões econômicas chamando atenção para o impacto de fatores socias na qualidade dos lucros e na GC das empresas.
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